

**AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 116-57**  
**OFFERED BY MR. KRISHNAMOORTHY OF ILLINOIS**

At the end of subtitle F of title XII, add the following:

1 **SEC. \_\_. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CROSS-BORDER VIO-**  
2 **LENCE BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC**  
3 **OF CHINA AND INDIA AND THE GROWING**  
4 **TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OF CHINA.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
6 ings:

7 (1) Since a truce in 1962 ended skirmishes be-  
8 tween the People's Republic of China and India, the  
9 countries have been divided by a 2,100-mile-long  
10 Line of Actual Control.

11 (2) In the decades since the truce, military  
12 standoffs between the People's Republic of China  
13 and India have flared; however, the standoffs have  
14 rarely claimed the lives of soldiers.

15 (3) In the months leading up to June, 15,  
16 2020, along the Line of Actual Control, the People's  
17 Republic of China's military—

18 (A) reportedly amassed 5,000 soldiers; and

1 (B) is trying to redraw long-standing set-  
2 tled boundaries through the use of force and  
3 aggression.

4 (4) On June 6, 2020, the People's Republic of  
5 China and India reached an agreement of de-esca-  
6 late and disengage along the Line of Actual Control.

7 (5) On June 15, 2020, at least 20 Indian sol-  
8 diers and an unconfirmed number of Chinese sol-  
9 diers were killed in skirmishes following a weekslong  
10 standoff in Eastern Ladakh, which is the de facto  
11 border between India and the People's Republic of  
12 China.

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
14 gress that—

15 (1) there is significant concern about the con-  
16 tinued military aggression by the People's Republic  
17 of China along its border with India and in other  
18 parts of the world, including with Bhutan, in the  
19 South China Sea, and with the Senkaku Islands, as  
20 well as the Government of the People's Republic of  
21 China's aggressive posture toward Hong Kong and  
22 Taiwan; and

23 (2) the Government of the People's Republic of  
24 China should work toward de-escalating the situa-  
25 tion along the Line of Actual Control with India

- 1 through existing diplomatic mechanisms and not
- 2 through force.

